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Abstract: Under most federal environmental laws and some health and safety laws, states
may apply for “primacy,” that is, authority to implement and enforce federal law, through
a process known as “authorization.” Some observers fear that states use authorization to
adopt more lax policies in a regulatory “race to the bottom.” This paper presents a simple
model of the interaction between the federal and state governments in such a scheme of
partial decentralization. Our model suggests that the authorization option may not only
increase social welfare but also allow more stringent environmental regulations than would
otherwise be feasible. Our model also suggests that the federal government may choose its
policies so that states that desire more strict regulation authorize, while other states remain
under the federal program. We then test this hypothesis using data on federal regulation of
water pollution and of hazardous waste, which are two of the most important environmental
programs to allow authorization. We find that states that prefer more environmental pro-
tection authorize more quickly under both policies. This evidence suggests that states seek
authorization to adopt more strict policies instead of more lax policies compared to federal
policies.
Acknowledgments: We are grateful for comments on earlier drafts from Francesca Mazzolari,
Per Fredriksson, and conference participants at the World Congress of Environmental and Resource
Economists and at meetings of the American Law and Economics Association and of the Society
for Environmental Law and Economics.
States may voluntarily take control of implementation and enforcement of most U.S. en-
vironmental regulations, through a process known as “authorization.” Authorization gives
states “primacy,” that is, substantial control over the effects of federal environmental policies.
For example, the U.S. General Accounting Office (U.S. GAO, 1996) examined the stringency
of water pollution permits issued by different states and found that, for similar size facilities,
allowable pollution varied by more than one order of magnitude. Authorized states have con-
siderable discretion over enforcement as well; it is rare for the federal government to impose
penalties on facilities in an authorized state where enforcement actions have been deficient
(Helland, 1998).1 Some observers suggest that authorization allows states to pursue more
lax policies and express fears of a regulatory “race to the bottom” that undermines federal
policies (Flatt, 1997, p. 34; Crotty, 1987, p. 67). Thus, understanding this “cooperative
federalism” is central to evaluating the effects of federal environmental policies in practice.
We present a simple model of the interaction between the states and the federal gov-
ernment with endogenous federal environmental policies and the option of authorization.
Our model offers a more benign view of authorization than the “race to the bottom” sce-
nario suggests. In our model, authorization allows higher levels of social welfare and stricter
environmental policies than would otherwise be feasible. Our analysis also suggests some
conditions under which states will want to seek authorization. We then test our hypothe-
ses using data on two federal environmental policies: the Clean Water Act (CWA), which
regulates water pollution, and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), which
regulates hazardous and solid waste. Our empirical analysis evaluates the factors that ex-
plain whether a state receives authorization under each of the laws early, late, or not at
all.
1For example, in 1999, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit ruled that the federal EPA could
not take enforcement action over Harmon Industries’ violations of the RCRA where the State of Missouri
had already acted, even though the EPA found the state penalties to be lax (Harmon Industries, Inc. v.
Browner, 191 F.3d 894 (8th Cir. 1999)).
1
Our principal empirical focus is on the role of preference heterogeneity in determining
authorization. If, as some fear, authorized states use their discretion to weaken environmental
protection, then we would expect the least “green” states to seek authorization first. Our
model of authorization, however, suggests that the federal government may adopt policies
designed to encourage authorization applications from states that prefer more environmental
protection rather than less. We test this hypothesis empirically. We also test for a “U-
shape” relationship in which states with median preferences are most content with centralized
regulations, whereas those with preferences far from the median in either direction tend to
authorize sooner.2 We find that states with relatively “green” environmental preferences
authorize sooner under both CWA and RCRA. This evidence is consistent with the more
benign view of authorization suggested by our model.
In addition to exploring the role of environmental preferences, we test a few other hy-
potheses about the determinants of authorization. We find that states with greater potential
to generate interstate externalities may authorize somewhat later, suggesting federal efforts
to limit negative externalities among the states. We also find that the size and tax or leg-
islative capacity of state governments, however, do not have a statistically significant effects
on the speed of authorization.
The rest of this paper sets forth our analysis as follows. Section 1 gives background on
authorization under the CWA and RCRA, as well as a discussion of the previous literature.
Section 2 develops a model of authorization in which the federal government sets environmen-
tal policies endogenously, anticipating the effects on state incentives to seek authorization.
Section 3 describes the variables we choose to represent the empirical determinants of au-
thorization across states. Section 4 presents the results of duration models of the time until
2Studying state liquor control laws, Strumpf and Oberholzer-Gee (2002) test the hypothesis that greater
preference heterogeneity across districts within a state increases the likelihood that the state chooses to
decentralize its policy. We test a related proposition: the more a jurisdiction’s tastes differ from the median,
the more it wishes to control its policy.
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authorization. Section 5 concludes with policy implications.
1 Authorization under CWA and RCRA
The CWA and RCRA are two of the most important environmental policies that allow
authorization.3 Under both of these acts, the federal and regional EPA offices act as the
default administrator; a state must take the initiative to apply for authorization. If states
can demonstrate to the EPA that they will adopt legislation that is at least as stringent as
the federal standards and have the means to fund the implementation and enforcement of
the policy, then they can receive authorization. The EPA’s criteria for acceptance are public
knowledge, so states only incur the cost of applying for authorization if they meet all of the
requirements. The EPA usually requires amendments to a state’s proposed implementation
plan and holds public hearings on the application throughout the state before it grants
authorization (Freeman, 2000; Helland, 1998). A search of the Federal Register did not turn
up any instances of a state’s application being denied.
Once the EPA grants authorization, the EPA finds it infeasible to retract and has never
done so in practice, although the EPA is legally entitled to do so. For example, Arkansas
refuses to impose federal discharge limits and monitoring requirements for municipal water
pollution sources on the grounds that they are too strict, but the regional EPA office says
that taking primacy back from Arkansas is “an unrealistic option” (GAO, 1996, p. 6). The
EPA lacks a credible threat in large part because it lacks the resources necessary to take the
delegated functions back from authorized states (Flatt, 1997, p. 16; GAO, 1995, pp. 20-22).
Some earlier studies consider the revealed preference for voluntary decentralization in
3The third major environmental program that allows authorization is the Clean Air Act (CAA). However,
the CAA differs from the CWA and RCRA in that the default implementation responsibility lies with the
states, which are required to develop State Implementation Plans; states opt-in for enforcement, but not
implementation. Other federal environmental regulations, such as the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and
Rodenticide Act and the Safe Drink Water Act (1976), also allow authorization (ECOS, 2010), but are much
smaller programs than RCRA and CWA in terms of costs.
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various other policy contexts. Cutter and DeShazo (2007) study a policy in which Califor-
nia counties could devolve responsibility for enforcement of an underground storage tank
program (under RCRA) to cities; they conclude that higher enforcement effort in delegated
cities is the result of selection by both parties (the counties and the cities) and that predic-
tions about the effect of decentralization should consider this selection. Meyer and Konisky
(2007) find that a number of characteristics cause local communities to take control under
a Massachusetts wetland protection program. These studies do not consider transboundary
spillovers or the problem raised for the central government when it lacks an effective veto
power over authorization.
Other empirical studies have explored the effects of authorization in the federal context.
Helland (1998) finds an insignificant effect of authorization on the probability of inspection
of paper and pulp facilities under the CWA. Sigman (2005) presents evidence that when
states obtain authorization under the CWA, the water quality in downstream states wors-
ens. Outside the environmental area, Morantz (2007) finds authorized states enforce federal
employment safety laws less aggressively than the federal government.
Finally, some studies have examined the factors that explain the decision by states to
seek authorization under federal environmental laws, which is the focus of our analysis.
In particular, political scientists have studied the relationship between authorization and
the strangth of a state’s commitment to environmental protection.4 These prior studies
have produced mixed results on this question. Some have found a positive relationship
between past efforts by a state to protect the environment and authorization under various
environmental laws (Crotty, 1987, p. 65), including the CWA (Wassenberg, 1986, pp. 132-
33). Lester and Bowman (1989, p. 749), on the other hand, find a negative relationship
between authorization under RCRA and environmental interest group strength. Woods
4Lowry (1992, pp. 67-68) investigates whether various factors affect authorization under the CWA but
does not examine a state’s commitment to environmental protection as a factor.
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(2005, pp. 269-70) finds a statistically significant and negative relationship between state
initiatives to protect the environment and primacy under the CWA and the Clean Air Act.
Hunter and Waterman (1996, pp. 127-28) find no correlation between political support
for the environment and primacy under the CWA. Each of these prior studies by political
scientists, however, rely only on variations among the states to explain their decisions to
seek authorization. Our methodology and data allow us to exploit variation not only among
the states but also over time to explore the factors that make authorization more likely at
any given point in time. Sigman (2003) reviews the literature on authorization and provides
less formal tests of some of the hypotheses tested formally here.
1.1 The Clean Water Act
Under the Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, individual states had sole responsibility for
setting, implementing, and enforcing standards, while the federal role was oversight. Over
time, this arrangement became viewed as problematic for a number of reasons. One reason
was that “states varied enormously in their commitment to pollution control objectives”
(Freeman 2000, p. 173). The 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act (which later became
known as CWA) gave the federal government control over establishing minimum effluent
limits (restrictions on quantities, rates and concentrations of chemical, biological, and phys-
ical pollutants that can be discharged into navigable waters) and issuing permits under the
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES). Industrial facilities and sewage
treatment works need an NPDES permit to discharge pollutants into navigable waters. The
1972 act also included a provision allowing authorization. Once a state obtains the right
to issue NPDES permits, it follows the guidelines it has established under its authorizing
legislation, rather than the federal standards.5
5The CWA allows partial delegation. In 1972, the only section of the CWA for which states could be
authorized was base NPDES permitting. As new sections were added to the CWA, state authorization
became available for them as well. Currently, states can receive authorization under five sections of the
5
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Figure 1: Year of base CWA authorization
Forty-five states have authorization over NPDES and general permitting; New Mexico,
Alaska, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Idaho are not currently authorized. Figure 1
maps the year of authorization by state. Over half of the states were authorized under the
base NPDES policy in the first three years.
1.2 The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
RCRA first emerged as amendments to an older law (1965 Solid Waste Disposal Act) in
1976. Congress substantially strengthened RCRA with the Hazardous and Solid Waste
Amendments (HSWA) in 1984. The EPA first allowed state delegation under the base
RCRA program in 1982. This base program governs the permitting of hazardous waste
facilities and establishes requirements for safe recycling, composting, storage, and disposal
CWA: base NPDES permitting, general permitting, regulation of pretreatment programs and standards for
sewage treatment works, NPDES permits for federal facilities, and the management of biosolids (sewage
sludge) disposal. All authorized states have responsibility for at least base NPDES permitting.
6
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Figure 2: Year of initial RCRA authorization
of waste. Permits issued under RCRA are more standardized than NPDES permits, as they
rely more heavily on federal technology standards. Thus, authorization under RCRA gives
states less discretion than under CWA to adjust emission limits. Authorization still provides
control over the inspection of facilities and enforcement.
Figure 2 maps the years that states first received RCRA authorization. Two states,
Alaska and Iowa, are not currently authorized under any part of RCRA. As with the CWA,
this paper focuses on the initial decision to seek authorization under the base RCRA policy.
The vast majority of the states (80%) received authorization in the first 4 years.
Certain states are authorized under RCRA but not under the CWA and vice versa. The
correlation between the time to authorization under the two laws is only 0.04. The number
of sections for which a state is authorized under the CWA and the percentage of RCRA
for which it is authorized have a correlation of 0.20. These low correlations suggest the
importance of policy-specific factors to authorization.
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2 A Model of Endogenous Federal Regulation
To illustrate the possible role of authorization in federal environmental policy, we present a
simple model of the interaction between the federal and state governments. In evaluating the
effect of the authorization option on environmental regulations, it is important to consider
what policy the federal government would adopt in the absence of this option. Our model
allows us to determine federal policy as an endogenous variable and thereby reveals how the
option of authorization may not only increase social welfare but also allow more stringent
environmental regulations than would otherwise be feasible. In particular, the authorization
alternative may make it possible for the federal government to regulate in circumstances that
would otherwise prevent any federal regulation.
2.1 Pure Decentralization
First, suppose that each state may choose its own regulatory policies for a particular pollu-
tant. For simplicity, assume that there are only two types of states, L and H. Let Ri represent
the amount of pollution allowed by the regulatory policies imposed in a state of type i. Ri
reflects not only the state’s formal regulatory standards but also the effective stringency of
its policies, including policy implementation, pollution monitoring, and enforcement.6 The
two types differ only in terms of the pollution levels they would choose; all states are iden-
tical in all other respects. Type L would choose R∗L, and type H would choose R
∗
H , where
0 < R∗L < R
∗
H . Let h represent the fraction of states that are type H, so that 1−h represents
the fraction that are type L, where 0 < h < 1.
If we assume that each state maximizes the welfare of its own residents, then Ri represents
6Thus, our model does not distinguish between standard-setting and enforcement, but subsumes both
functions into a single overall stringency. For studies that distinguish these activities in the context of a
federal system, see CBO (1997), Lin (2010), and Hutchinson and Kennedy (2008). The latter consider
strategic standard-setting by the federal government when states will control enforcement and may “free
ride.”
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the optimal level of pollution from that perspective. Under this normative interpretation
of our model, each state would be minimizing the sum of the costs its residents would bear
from pollution and the costs they would bear from pollution abatement. Otherwise, we can
adopt a purely descriptive interpretation of our model, in which case the policy chosen by
each state merely reflects the political pressures applied by its constituents.
Let Ui(Ri) represent the utility enjoyed by each state of type i as a result of its own
regulatory policy Ri, where:
Ui(Ri) = −(Ri −R∗i )2. (1)
Thus, type i suffers a cost that increases as the Ri imposed on its polluters deviates further
from its optimum R∗i . The marginal cost of this deviation also increases as Ri deviates
further from R∗i .
2.2 Interstate Negative Externalities
Suppose that the federal regulator seeks to maximize national utility, which we define as
the mean of the state utilities. National utility does not simply equal the average of the
Ui functions, however, because the pollution allowed in each state imposes an external cost
on the other states. Let this external cost equal aRi for each state of type i, where a is
a parameter representing the relative importance of this negative externality and a > 0.
Assume that this cost reduces national utility without affecting the Ui functions.
Thus, because the federal regulator takes this negative externality into account, it prefers
a different Ri for type i than a state of type i would prefer for itself. In particular, rather
than choosing Ri to maximize Ui, the federal regulator would prefer the Ri that internalizes
this externality and thus maximizes UiN , where:
UiN = Ui(Ri) − aRi. (2)
9
That is, the federal regulator would like to choose RH and RL to maximize national utility
UN , where:
UN(RH , RL) = hUHN(RH) + (1 − h)ULN(RL). (3)
Under a policy of pure decentralization, each state of type i would adopt R∗i , and national
welfare would be:
UN(R
∗
H , R
∗
L) = −aR̄.
where R̄ denotes the mean R∗i :
R̄ = hR∗H + (1 − h)R∗L. (4)
Pure decentralization would be optimal only if a = 0. Given that a > 0, we can show that
the federal regulator would prefer instead that each state of type i adopt RiN , where:
RiN = R
∗
i − a/2 (5)
assuming that
R∗L > a/2, (6)
so that we have an interior solution. Assume that inequality (6) holds, so that even the most
stringent policies that we consider would allow some pollution.
This policy for each state would maximize UN . Under the normative interpretation of
our model, national utility would represent national welfare. Under the purely descriptive
interpretation, national utility simply reflects the political pressures applied by constituents
in all of the states, including the pressure applied by residents of each state who bear the
cost of pollution emitted in other states.
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2.3 The Uniform Federal Policy
Suppose that political or legal constraints or information asymmetries prevent the federal
government from discriminating among states based on type. Thus, the federal regulator
must apply a uniform policy to all states, as assumed under the pure form of the Oates
Decentralization Theorem (Oates, 1972). In particular, suppose that the federal regulator
only has the option of imposing a single policy RN nationwide. In this case, the federal
regulator can reduce the cost of externalities but only by losing the flexibility advantages
of pure decentralization. A uniform policy nationwide is costly as long as states are not all
identical.
If the federal regulator must impose a single policy RN nationwide, then we can show
that the federal regulator would choose R∗N , where:
R∗N = R̄− a/2. (7)
We can show that national welfare under policy R∗N would be greater than it would be under
pure decentralization if and only if:
h(1 − h) < a
2
4(R∗H −R∗L)2
. (8)
Thus, if a is sufficiently large relative to the difference between the two types, then inequality
(8) holds, and the gain from reducing external costs outweighs the costs of imposing this
uniform policy on heterogeneous states.
If a is sufficiently small relative to this difference, however, then inequality (8) is reversed:
h(1 − h) > a
2
4(R∗H −R∗L)2
, (9)
and the costs of the uniform policy outweighs its benefits. Under the normative interpre-
11
tation of our model, any uniform policy would reduce national welfare compared to pure
decentralization if inequality (9) holds. Under the descriptive interpretation, any uniform
policy would be politically infeasible in this case.
2.4 The Role of the Authorization Option
Now suppose instead that the federal regulator has another possible option. In particular,
suppose the federal regulator can impose RN as federal policy on one type while costlessly
authorizing the other type to choose its own policy. By providing this alternative to pure
decentralization and the uniform federal policy, the authorization option can provide some
of the benefits of federal regulation without all the costs of the uniform policy. Suppose the
federal regulator can choose either type H or type L to regulate.
In either case, if the federal regulator chooses to regulate type i and to authorize type j to
adopt its own policy, then national utility would be unambiguously better than it would be
under pure decentralization. Although type j would still choose R∗j , the federal government
could now impose RN = RiN on type i, which is the nationally optimal policy for that
type.7 This policy would increase national utility compared to pure decentralization even if
inequality (9) holds, so that the federal government would prefer pure decentralization over
any uniform policy. Thus, the authorization option may make federal regulation possible
when such regulation would otherwise be infeasible.8 This federal regulation would reduce
total pollution and (under the normative interpretation of our model) improve national
welfare.
Furthermore, we can show that the federal regulator would prefer to regulate type L and
7The increase in national utility (from improving Ri) under this policy compared to pure decentralization
would equal (1 − h)a2/4 if the federal government were to regulate type L and would equal ha2/4 if the
federal government were to regulate type H instead.
8Crotty (1987, p. 54) describes authorization as an important element of the political compromise that
allowed the federal government to enact environmental laws in the face of hostility to federal preemption of
state power in this area.
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authorize type H rather than imposing R∗N nationwide as long as:
1 − h > a
2
4(R∗H −R∗L)2
. (10)
Similarly, we can show that the federal regulator would prefer to regulate type H and au-
thorize type L rather than imposing R∗N nationwide as long as:
h >
a2
4(R∗H −R∗L)2
. (11)
Thus, if either inequality (10) or inequality (11) holds, then under the normative interpre-
tation of our model, the authorization alternative would increase national welfare compared
to the uniform federal policy R∗N . Moreover, each condition is less demanding than inequal-
ity (9). Thus, even when uniform federal regulation is a feasible option, the authorization
alternative may yield higher national welfare than uniform federal regulation.
The federal government may choose to regulate type L and authorize type H. We can
also show that:
RLN < R
∗
N < R
∗
H . (12)
In this case, as feared by critics, authorization would allow type H states to adopt policies
more lax than the federal policy RLN . The alternative to authorization, however, would
not be to impose that same federal policy RLN on type H states. The federal regulator
chooses RLN only when anticipating authorization for type H states. In the absence of the
authorization option, the federal regulator would choose a more lax federal policy (R∗N), if
such a policy is feasible at all. In any event, the authorization option allows the federal
regulator to apply a more stringent policy to type L states than would otherwise be possible.
The federal government may choose instead to regulate type H and authorize type L.
Unlike the authorization scenario commonly feared by critics, this authorization policy allows
13
the type L states to adopt more stringent policies than the policy adopted by the federal
regulator (RHN). Furthermore, even if R
∗
N is feasible as an alternative, because R
∗
N < RHN ,
authorization allows the federal regulator to apply policies that are more tailored to type
H states (albeit more lax) than the federal policy that would apply in the absence of the
authorization option. Finally, we can also show that:
R∗L < R
∗
N (13)
if and only if:
h >
a
2(R∗H −R∗L)
, (14)
which is a more demanding condition than inequality (11). Thus, if inequality (14) holds,
then even the uniform policy that the federal regulator would adopt in the absence of the
authorization option (R∗N), if such a policy is feasible, would be more lax than the policy
applied by type L states under authorization (R∗L). In this case, even if R
∗
N is feasible,
authorization would allow type L states to apply more stringent policies than the federal
government would otherwise impose on them.
If all of these three options for federal regulation are feasible, then the federal regulator
would prefer at least one of these options over pure decentralization: The federal regulator
would prefer to impose R∗N nationwide as long as a is large enough relative to the difference
R∗H−R∗L to ensure that neither inequality (10) nor inequality (11) holds. That is, the federal
regulator would prefer the uniform policy only if the negative externalities among states are
sufficiently large relative to the difference between type L and type H states.
If the difference R∗H −R∗L is instead large enough relative to a that either inequality (10)
or inequality (11) holds, however, then the federal regulator would prefer to authorize one
of the types to choose its own policy rather than impose R∗N nationwide. In particular, we
can show that under these circumstances, the federal regulator would prefer to regulate L
14
and authorize H if:
h <
1
2
(15)
but would prefer to regulate H and authorize L if:
h >
1
2
(16)
instead. That is, the federal regulator would seek to regulate the more common type and
authorize the less common type, because by regulating the more common type, the federal
regulator can obtain the larger reduction in external costs and thus the larger improvement
in national utility.
Note that both inequality (11) and inequality (16) make inequality (14) more likely to
hold. In this sense, inequality (14) — and thus inequality (13) — is likely to hold if the
federal regulator chooses to regulate type H and authorize type L. Thus, authorization is
likely to allow more stringent policies for type L than the federal government would otherwise
apply to those states.
2.5 Implementation of the Authorization Alternatives
The discussion in Section 2.4 assumed that both of the authorization alternatives are feasible
despite the constraint that requires the same federal policy to apply to all states. Consistent
with this requirement of formal equality, the authorization policies adopted under the CWA
and the RCRA allow all states to apply for authorization. Although a successful application
must propose a state policy at least as stringent as the EPA’s policy, states granted autho-
rization may in fact deviate from the proposed policy, and as discussed in Section 1, the
EPA has never rescinded authorization. Thus, the EPA typically does not actually punish
an authorized state for lax implementation or enforcement of the proposed policy. In this
sense, authorization under these statutes resembles the authorization assumed in our model,
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which allows states to adopt policies that deviate from the federal policy, even those that
are less stringent than the federal policy.
To implement the authorization policies outlined in our model, however, federal policies
must deter authorization for the type of state that the federal regulator prefers to regulate.
The federal government may be unable to observe a given state’s type perfectly or may face
political constraints in denying authorization to an applicant state on the basis of inferences
regarding type. We next discuss how the federal regulator can induce the two types to
separate without any explicit discrimination between types.
Here we introduce the costs associated with authorization, which include the costs that
a state government bears when it implements and enforces its own environmental policy. In
the absence of authorization, the federal government would bear these implementation costs,
which we denote CI , where CI > 0. In this sense, CI is a price paid by a state that authorizes
to the rest of the country. As that state in effect transfers CI to others within the country,
however, CI does not represent a cost in terms of national utility. Another cost imposed on
a state that authorizes is the fixed cost of applying for authorization, which we denote CA,
where CA > 0. Unlike CI , the authorization application process imposes costs that reduce
national utility. The federal government in effect sets CA by determining the substantive
and procedural requirements for authorization. The federal government also controls CI by
deciding how much federal funding to offer to subsidize implementation and enforcement by
authorized states.9 For now, assume that not only CA but also CI is the same for all states.
Together, the two costs imposed by authorization, CI +CA, may induce the two types of
states to separate as long as one type has more to gain from authorization than the other.
Suppose the federal regulator first chooses both CI + CA and RN , then each state decides
9Crotty (1987, p. 55) and the GAO (1995, p. 11) cite the availability of federal funding as an important
incentive for states to seek authorization.
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whether to apply for authorization. If
(RN −R∗i )2 > CI + CA (17)
then type i gains from authorization and such a state will apply. Otherwise, the state will
not apply. For at least some parameter values, the federal regulator can choose CI +CA and
RN to induce its chosen type to apply while deterring applications from the other type.
For example, the federal regulator can induce type H to apply while deterring type L by
choosing RN = RNL. Type H would then stand to gain more than type L from authorization,
because RNL < R
∗
L < R
∗
H . Thus, RN would then be more costly for type H than for type L.
The federal regulator can separate the types as long as it can choose CI + CA such that the
gain for type H is greater than CI +CA while the gain for type L is less than CI +CA. Insofar
as authorization requires CA > 0, however, the cost of authorization in terms of national
utility would make this alternative less attractive to the federal regulator.
For some parameter values, the federal regulator can also induce type L to apply while
deterring type H by choosing RN = RNH . If:
a < R∗H −R∗L (18)
then RNH will be closer to R
∗
H than to R
∗
L, so that type L will have more to gain from
authorization than type H. If instead inequality (18) does not hold, then the federal regulator
would have to set RN above RNH in order to deter type H from authorization while still
inducing type L to apply. In particular, the constraint
RN >
R∗H + R
∗
L
2
(19)
would bind. In either case, the federal regulator can separate the types as long as it can
17
choose CI +CA such that the gain for type L is greater than CI +CA while the gain for type
H is less than CI + CA.
Insofar as authorization requires CA > 0 or RN > RNH , authorization becomes less
attractive to the federal regulator. In this sense, the federal regulator is most likely to
regulate type H and authorize type L when inequality (18) holds. In this case, inequality
(16) implies inequality (14), and inequality (13) would therefore hold. Thus, when the federal
regulator authorizes type L, this policy seems likely to allow type L states to apply more
stringent policies than would otherwise be imposed by the federal regulator.
2.6 Other considerations
Results from the simple model can generalize to a context with greater heterogeneity across
states. In particular, we are interested in the heterogeneity observed in our data. We next
set forth some hypotheses to test in our empirical analysis.
In our simple model, the federal regulator chooses between authorizing type H and autho-
rizing type L based on the value of h, that is, the probability of each type. In a more complex
model, the federal regulator would also consider many other factors that may outweigh the
probability of each type. For example, we have assumed that the external cost imposed by
each state on other states is simply proportional to the level of pollution allowed by that
state, so that the marginal external cost is constant. If the marginal external cost were
to increase with the level of pollution, however, then this increase may militate in favor of
federal regulation of type H rather than type L. Thus, we may expect “greener” preferences
to make authorization more likely.
We could also introduce heterogeneity among states in terms of the external costs they
impose on other states. If one type happens on average to impose greater marginal external
costs than the other, then this factor would militate in favor of federal regulation for the
type expected to generate larger negative externalities. Thus, we may expect states that
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impose the largest negative externalities on other states to be the least likely to authorize.
States may also be heterogeneous in other ways within each type. For example, they may
vary in terms of how costly authorization would be for the state government. To the extent
that CI or varies among the states, those states with higher costs would be less likely to
apply for authorization. States may also vary in terms of the costs they bear when policies
deviate from their preferred policies. Those states that bear the greatest costs from a given
deviation would be more likely to seek authorization. These sources of heterogeneity imply
that the federal regulator may not be able to separate types perfectly using only CA and RN
as instruments, which would make authorization less attractive to the federal regulator.
We can also introduce a larger number of types. Once we introduce a third type, for
example, then the incentive to authorize may not be monotonic in environmental preferences.
Suppose, for example, we add a type M to our model, where R∗L < R
∗
M < R
∗
H . If the
differences R∗H − R∗M and R∗M − R∗L are large enough relative to a, and states are more
likely to be type M than type L or type H, then the federal regulator may prefer to set
RN = R
∗
M − a/2 and authorize both type L and type H to adopt their own policies. This
case suggests that the probability of authorization may also be a U-shaped function of
environmental preferences.
Finally, in our model, the opportunity to authorize arises only once. We can also intro-
duce multiple periods into our model with multiple opportunities to authorize and param-
eters that change over time. In each period, the federal regulator may change RN and CA,
and states that have not already obtained authorization may decide whether to apply for
authorization. The state’s decision whether to apply in each period would depend on its
preferences and costs at time t.10
10Both the states and the federal regulator may also consider their expectations regarding the values that
all relevant parameters may take in the future. The federal regulator, in particular, may value the option
of regulating states in the future, and this option value would tend to militate against authorization at the
margin.
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3 Empirical implementation
Equation (17) provides the basis for an empirical analysis of this model. It suggests that a
state’s decision to apply for authorization at time t depends on the centralized alternative
to authorization RNt, the costs associated with authorization CIt + CAt, and the state
characteristics that determine the states’ private optimum R∗it. Because these variables can
change over time, we employ a duration model with time-varying covariates for our empirical
analysis.11
As the principal determinant of the state’s private optimum R∗it, we focus on measures
of environmental preferences in the state, with the idea that states with “greener” prefer-
ences likely desire stricter controls (lower R∗i ). To measure the level of concern about the
environment, the estimated equations principally use the adjusted League of Conservation
Voters (LCV) score averaged for the state’s Congressional delegation each year. The LCV
score is the percentage of times a legislator voted with the LCV’s position on environmental
legislation in a particular year. Groseclose et al. (1999) present a method to adjust these
scores for the changing slate of legislation, creating an estimate of the legislator’s parameter
that is consistent over time; Groseclose (2010) generously provides up-to-date adjusted LCV
scores. The LCV score has been used frequently in the empirical literature to indicate envi-
ronmental preferences (e.g., Gray and Shadbegian, 2004) because it is available for all states
annually since the 1970s. Levinson (2000) reports that a state’s average LCV score has a
high positive correlation with several major cross-sectional environmental scores. For our
purposes, the LCV score has the advantage of representing the views of the most influential
voters because it results from a political process.
Alternatively, we include dummy variables indicating whether a state ranked in the bot-
11Our empirical work examines only the decision to seek authority. We do not study the choice of R∗
by authorized states because it is challenging to identify the effects of authorization separately from its
determinants.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
CWA dataset RCRA dataset
Mean Standard Mean Standard
deviation deviation
Adjusted League of Conservation Voters (LCV) score 42.0 14.4 46.4 15.6
Environmental group membership per 1,000 (1993) .924 .568 .924 .568
State population (millions) 4.5 4.6 4.8 5.2
Personal income per capita (thousand 2005$) 20.2 3.4 23.5 3.7
State land area .072 .087 .072 .087
Coastal state .460 – – –
Number of permitted facilities (CWA or RCRA) 18.3 39.2 10.5 23.4
Ideological distance from president .261 .127 .353 .190
Tax capacity index 99.0 15.0 98.0 22.4
State employees per 1,000 people 16.9 5.6 17.2 6.0
Index of legislature’s professionalization (1986–88) .221 .144 .221 .144
Year 1977 5.3 1985 2.3
Note: Standard deviations are shown for continuous variables only.
tom or top thirds of the distribution of LCV score in a given year. These dummy variables
can capture nonlinearity in the relationship between LCV score and authorization, such as
the U-shape hypothesis discussed in Section 2.6. They also adjust the LCV scores for varia-
tion in legislation over time, much as the Groseclose et al. (1999) adjustment does, but with
fewer assumptions.
As another measure of green preferences, we use environmental group membership in the
state. The variable is membership in the World Wildlife Fund, Nature Conservancy, Natural
Resources Defense Council, and 7 smaller organizations per 1,000 residents (Wikle, 1995).
For this variable, we have a single cross-section for the year 1993. This variable is not our
preferred measure because it is not available over time and may reflect the frequency of views
far enough in the extreme of the distribution that they are not decisive politically.
Descriptive statistics for the adjusted LCV scores, environmental group membership, and
other covariates are shown in Table 1 separately for the CWA and RCRA datasets. To weight
each state equally, we first calculated the means of the variables over all of the years each
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state is in the dataset (a state is only in the dataset until it authorizes), and then we present
statistics calculated from these state means. The levels of variables differ between the CWA
and RCRA datasets because a given state is in each data set during different periods. Most
states were candidates for CWA authorization only in the 1970s and for RCRA authorization
only in the 1980s.
We also examine other possible determinants of the authorization decision. Similarity
between the state’s preferences and that of the federal government may affect the desire of
states to control their environmental programs. This hypothesis is addressed by looking for
authorization in states that deviate most from median environmental preferences. We also
consider the match between broad political preferences at the federal and state levels. Poole
(1998, 2010) provides an ideological score (liberal-conservative) on a single scale for both the
President and members of Congress, based on the positions they take on legislation. Our
“ideological distance” variable is the square of the difference between the President’s score
and the average score for the state’s Congressional delegation in a year.
Our model emphasizes the importance of interstate spillovers as a motivation for the
federal government to retain control over state programs. We consider two variables that
might indicate the extent of spillovers. First, almost all watersheds in interior states are
upstream of another state, so interior states may generate more interstate externalities under
the CWA than coastal states. As a result, the CWA equations include a dummy variable
that equals one for states on the coast and zero otherwise. Second, the potential for spillovers
is greatest in border regions (Kahn, 2004; Helland and Whitford, 2003). States with larger
land areas have a smaller share of border regions and may be less likely to generate interstate
externalities or to experience harm from spillovers.
The equations also include variables for the personal income per capita and population
of the state. Both of these measures are included to control for the availability of resources
that might reduce the opportunity cost of scarce state resources and thereby facilitate the
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state taking control of environmental programs. More populated and wealthier states may
have better organized state governments and thus shorter times to authorization. We would
like to separate these effects from the effects of environmental preferences, with which they
may be correlated. In Table 1, income is much higher for the RCRA than the CWA dataset,
largely reflecting the later period of the RCRA dataset.
The size of the task confronting the authorized state is represented by the number of
permitted facilities under the relevant statute. A larger number of facilities means higher
monitoring and enforcement costs CI . As these costs increase, states may choose to authorize
later. On the other hand, a larger number of facilities could indicate that a state has a larger
stake in obtaining authorization, which would militate in favor of rapid authorization. In
Table 1, the average number of regulated facilities per state is small for both programs
because many states authorized before a lot of permits had been issued; the large standard
deviations reflect much higher numbers of permits by end of the period.
Finally, we include several measures of the overall legislative and administrative capacity
of the state government, which may reduce opportunity costs and thereby facilitate manage-
ment of these environmental programs. The state’s ability to finance regulatory activities is
measured by its “tax capacity,” an index based on twenty-seven common state tax bases.12
This well-established measure provides a summary of revenue available to state policy-makers
that is comparable across states with different current tax structures. The number of full-
time equivalent state employees provides an indication of the size of the state government
and perhaps its ability to address new tasks. The variable derives from the Census Bureau’s
regular Census of State Governments.13
12The Advisory Council on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) calculated the measure periodically until
ACIR was disbanded. Berry and Fording (1997) fill the missing years through 1991. We predict values for
the small number of state-years in our data after 1991. The tax capacity index captures the relative status of
the states only, not aggregate trends. Not surprisingly, this variable is highly correlated with state income.
13This variable seems a better measure of the state’s ability to administer a program than revenues or
spending; the latter measures may include components not directly related to the available resources, such
as debt service and intergovernmental transfers.
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Some equations also include a variable to measure the “professionalization” of the legis-
lature (Squire, 1997). This index considers the legislature’s time in session, legislative staff
levels, and legislators’ salary, based on data from 1986–88. The index ranges from .042
(New Hampshire) to .659 (New York). A more professional legislature is likely to be more
prompt in taking up the legislation necessary to secure authorization than a less professional
legislature.
Each estimated equation includes dummies for the EPA region. The ten regional EPA
offices undertake implementation and enforcement when states are not authorized and over-
sight when they are. The dummies may thus capture heterogeneity across the regions in the
“centralized” alternative to authorization, as well as more general geographic heterogeneity.14
4 Empirical Results
This section presents the estimates of states’ “hazard” rates for initial authorization of the
base policies under the CWA and RCRA. The first states authorized in 1973 under the CWA
and in 1984 under the RCRA, so these mark the start of the “at-risk” period in our analysis.
The analysis extends through 2002, the most recent year that any state authorized under
either program.15
The models presented below are estimated using a multi-period discrete-choice model
that allows a very flexible specification of the baseline hazard rate (Meyer, 1990; Cameron
14Several possible covariates were excluded from the empirical specification of the model because of endo-
geneity concerns. The state budget for environmental regulation is one example. If a state is preparing to
apply for authorization or has already received authorization, it will have to increase the resources devoted
to environmental policy. Thus, the path of this variable will depend upon the duration.
15Although a state applies for authorization some time before it actually receives it, we use the time until
the state receives authorization as the dependent variable because it is more readily available. The delay is
usually short, within the year that we use as the period for our analysis. For example, Florida submitted
its application for authorization under the CWA on November 21, 1994 and it was accepted on May 1, 1995
(Federal Register, 1995). Texas submitted its CWA authorization application on February 2, 1998 and it was
approved on September 14, 1998 (Federal Register, 1998). We cannot use cross-state variation to understand
the time between application and acceptance because all states are subject to the same federal process.
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and Trivedi, 2005).16 The model estimates determinants of the likelihood of authorization
by a state in a given year. Thus, a positive coefficient reflects a higher hazard rate and a
shorter expected time to authorization.
The estimates for the hazard rates for initial CWA authorization are in Table 2, and
those for RCRA authorization are in Table 3. For both sets of equations, the parameters
representing a third-degree polynomial in time are statistically significant, indicating that
the probability of authorizing depends upon time in a non-linear way. The first three columns
in each table focus on the effects of environmental preferences, and the last two add other
covariates.
4.1 CWA Authorization
In the first column of Table 2, the coefficient on the adjusted LCV score is positive, suggesting
faster authorization of “greener” states, but is not statistically significant. In column (2), the
high LCV dummy (top third of the distribution) is positive and significant at 5%, whereas
the low LCV dummy (bottom third) is not significant. If all high LCV states were switched
to the middle group, the median predicted probability of authorization for these states would
fall from 5.1 percent each year to 1.8 percent each year. This pattern is consistent with the
case in our model in which the federal government discourages authorization by states whose
anticipated stringency is below a certain threshold. This model would suggest monotonicity
— but possible nonlinearity — in the relationship.
In column (3), an alternative measure of green preferences, environmental group mem-
bership, also has a coefficient with a positive point estimate. This coefficient is statistically
16This approach “stacks” states at risk of authorizing in any year and estimates a binary response model
for whether the state authorizes in that year. Based on a proportional hazard model, the binary response
model estimated has a complementary log-log binary form (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). We tried including
a gamma-distributed heterogeneity across states, using the Stata routine by Jenkins (2004). However, tests
never rejected the absence of this heterogeneity. For many specifications, the model with heterogeneity did
not converge.
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Table 2: Semi-parametric discrete-choice hazard models: CWA authorization
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Adjusted LCV score .019 – – – –
(.013)
Bottom third LCV score – .150 – .152 .249
(.443) (.495) (.514)
Top third LCV score – 1.055∗ – 1.000∗ .904†
(.426) (.461) (.489)
Conservation group membership – – .834† – –
(.474)
State population – – – .061 .093
(.053) (.086)
Personal income per capita – – – -.109 -.161
(.085) (.104)
State land area – – – -5.01 -4.41
(3.71) (3.64)
Coastal state – – – 1.422∗ 1.251†
(.631) (.697)
Number of permitted facilities (100s) – – – .115† .107
(.067) (.069)
Ideological distance from president – – – .043 .105
(.879) (.895)
Tax capacity – – – – .0066
(.0100)
State employees – – – – .050
(.053)
Legislative professionalization – – – – .444
(2.15)
Log likelihood -128 -126 -128 -120 -119
Notes: All equations include a cubic in time and dummies for the EPA regions.
Observations: 486 state-years.
Standard errors in parentheses.
†significant at 10%; ∗significant at 5%
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significant at the 10% level. A one standard deviation increase in environmental group
membership increases the median annual hazard of authorization from 4.9 percent to 7.6
percent. Thus, this coefficient provides additional support for the hypothesis that greener
states expect greater benefits from authorization.17
Column (4) tests the robustness of the basic result that high LCV score states authorize
earlier by including additional explanatory variables. The pattern of coefficients on the LCV
dummies remains the same: The high LCV dummy remains statistically significant at the
5% level in column (4).
The coastal dummy is significant and positive, which means that states on the U.S.
coasts are more likely to authorize sooner. The median predicted hazard rates would fall
from 4.8 percent to 1.2 percent for these states were they not on the coast. This coefficient
is consistent with our hypothesis that the federal government prefers authorization when
negative externalities are less of a concern and therefore facilitates authorization by coastal
states. On the other hand, states with greater land area (and thus a small share of their land
near borders) are slower to authorize, but the coefficients are not statistically significant at
the 10% level.
The number of permitted facilities in the state has a statistically significant (at the 10%
level) and positive effect on the hazard. Thus, states with programs that are potentially
more costly to run authorize earlier. One possible explanation is that these states have more
of a stake in authorization and therefore apply sooner.
The ideological distance between the President and the state’s congressional delegation
does not have a statistically significant coefficient in any of the equations for CWA. (This
variable also fails to have a statistically significant effect on RCRA authorization in Table
3.)18
17Our results may not be surprising, given the limited resources provided to the EPA to implement
programs in states that are not authorized (GAO, 1995, p. 22).
18In earlier versions of the paper the equations included another variant of this measure, a dummy variable
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Column (5) adds variables to reflect state government’s legislative, bureaucratic, and
financial resources. None of these variables — tax capacity, the size of state government,
or the legislative professionalism index — yields a statistically significant coefficient. The
coefficients on all three, however, have the expected positive point estimates.19
LCV scores and conservation group membership are correlated with party affiliation
and with political ideology. For example, the correlation by state between adjusted LCV
score and Poole (1998)’s liberal-conservative dimension is -.69 (Poole’s left-wing scores are
negative). To test whether ideology rather than green preferences is driving the results, we
also estimated the equations with the average ideology score of the Congressional delegation
included as an explanatory variable (not shown). The ideology variable was not statistically
significant and did not much change the point estimates on either the LCV score variables
or environmental group membership for either CWA or RCRA.
4.2 RCRA Authorization
Table 3 contains discrete-choice models for the hazard rate for initial RCRA authorization.
The only covariate from Table 2 that is not included in the RCRA models in Table 3 is the
coastal indicator variable. Interior states are no more likely to generate interstate externali-
ties than coastal states under RCRA.
In column (1) in Table 3, the adjusted LCV score has a positive coefficient that is sta-
tistically significant at the 5% level. A one standard deviation increase in this score would
increase the median annual hazard of authorization from 22 percent to 41 percent. This
result is consistent with the hypothesis that states authorize faster if they desire stricter
for whether the dominant party in the state legislature was the president’s party. This dummy variable also
did not have a statistically significant coefficient.
19To test whether states with more resources were more willing to take on large programs, we also estimated
equations with an interaction between the tax capacity variable and the number of NPDES facilities. The
interaction had a substantively small and statistically insignificant coefficient. A similar interaction was also
insignificant in the RCRA equations below.
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Table 3: Semi-parametric discrete-choice hazard models: RCRA authorization
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Adjusted LCV score .038∗ – – .037† .051∗
(.017) (.019) (.020)
Bottom third LCV score – -.340 – – –
(.439)
Top third LCV score – .047 – – –
(.527)
Conservation group membership – – .431 – –
(.502)
State population – – – -.033 -.157
(.067) (.097)
Personal income per capita – – – -.017 -.011
(.062) (.073)
State land area – – – -1.37 3.89
(2.93) (4.04)
Number of permitted facilities (100s) – – – .876 .199
(1.24) (1.30)
Ideological distance from president – – – .015 .879
(1.00) (1.14)
Tax capacity – – – – .0043
(.0091)
State employees – – – – -.0169∗
(.0053)
Legislative professionalization – – – – .236
(2.39)
Log likelihood -86 -89 -89 -86 -81
Notes: All equations include a cubic in time and dummies for the EPA regions.
Observations: 184 state-years.
Standard errors in parentheses.
†significant at 10%; ∗significant at 5%
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standards. In column (2), the dummy variables for state’s relative LCV ranking do not
yield statistically significant coefficients, although the point estimates are consistent with a
monotonic relationship. The environmental group membership variable in column (3) has a
positive coefficient, which is again consistent with the greener states authorizing first, but
this coefficient is not statistically significant.
In column (4) of Table 3, the adjusted LCV score remains statistically significant at
the 10% level with the basic set of state characteristics included. The results for other
determinants of RCRA authorization differ from the results for CWA, perhaps indicating
that the sources of voluntary decentralization are fairly specific to the particular policy.
None of the other explanatory variables are statistically significant in column (4).
When state government capacity variables are added in column (5), the LCV coefficient
is again statistically significant at the 5% level and somewhat larger in magnitude. The
coefficients on population and the number of state employees per capita are both negative
(and the latter is statistically significant at the 5% level), which is surprising, as these
variables indicate states that have more resources to manage their RCRA programs. Perhaps
these states adopt independent legislation to strengthen environmental protection rather
than seek authorization under the federal policy; authorization under RCRA may give them
less discretion than they desire.
5 Conclusion
This paper studies the factors that cause states to seek control of their environmental policies.
In our simple model, the federal government adopts policies that anticipate the incentives
created for states to seek authorization. We present a relatively benign account of the effect of
the authorization option, which may increase social welfare and allow stricter environmental
policies than would be possible otherwise. With endogenously set federal policies, autho-
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rization may look attractive either to states that desire relatively tight pollution controls or
to those that desire relatively weaker controls, depending on the parameters.
Using econometric models of duration, we then explore the determinants of the speed with
which states authorize, focusing particularly on the role of environmental preferences. Our
results suggest that states with greener environmental preferences authorize sooner under
both the CWA and RCRA. Our main finding suggests that states seek authorization in order
to adopt stricter rather than weaker environmental policies than the federal government.
Our result is consistent with other studies in the empirical literature, which often fail to
find evidence that decentralization in the United States harms the environment (List and
Gerking, 2000; Millimet, 2003; Levinson, 2003). Thus, our analysis suggests that this form of
cooperative federalism may improve efficiency, by giving states flexibility to respond to their
local conditions while allowing the federal government to limit free riding and to provide a
minimum level of environmental quality. Our results do not lend support to concerns that
states authorize primarily to undermine federal controls.
31
References
Berry, William D. and Richard C. Fording. State Tax Capacity and Effort. Social Science
Quarterly 78 (1997): 158–166.
Cameron, A. Colin and Pravin K. Trivedi. Microeconometrics: Methods and Applications.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Congressional Budget Office (CBO). Federalism and Environmental Protection: Case Stud-
ies for Drinking Water and Ground-Level Ozone. Washington, DC: U.S. Congress,
1997.
Crotty, Patricia M. The New Federalism Game: Primacy Implementation of Environmental
Policy. Publius 17 (1987), 53–67.
Cutter, W. Bowman and J.R. DeShazo. The Environmental Consequences of Decentralizing
the Decision to Decentralize. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
53 (2007), 32–53.
Environmental Council of the States. http://www.ecos.org (Last viewed: January 2010).
Flatt, Victor B. A Dirty River Runs Through It (The Failure of Enforcement in the Clean
Water Act). Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review 25 (1997), 1–45.
Federal Register. Water Pollution Control; Approval of Application by the State of Florida
to Administer the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Pro-
gram. May 12, 1995 (http://www.epa.gov/fedrgstr/EPA-WATER/1995/May/Day-
12/pr-116.html)
Federal Register. State Program Requirements; Approval of Application to Administer
the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Program; Texas, 63
(1998), 51163–51201.
Freeman, A. Myrick. III. “Water Pollution Policy.” In Public Policies for Environmental
Protection, edited by P.R. Portney and R.N. Stavins. Washington, DC: Resources for
the Future, 2000, pp. 169–213.
Gray, Wayne and Ronald J. Shadbegian. ‘Optimal’ Pollution Abatement: Whose Benefits
Matter, and How Much? Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 47
(2004), 510–534.
Groseclose, Tim, Steven D. Levitt and James M. Snyder Jr. Comparing Interest Group
Scores Across Time and Chambers: Adjusted ADA Scores for the U.S. Congress.
American Political Science Review 93 (1999), 33–50.
32
Groseclose, Tim. http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/groseclose/Adj.Int.Group.-
Scores/ (Last viewed: August 2010).
Helland, Eric. The Revealed Preferences of State EPA’s: Stringency, Enforcement, and
Substitution. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 35 (1998), 242–
261.
Helland, Eric and Andrew B. Whitford. Pollution Incidence and Political Jurisdiction:
Evidence from the TRI. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 46
(2003), 403–24.
Hunter, Susan and Richard W. Waterman. Enforcing the Law: The Case of the Clean
Water Acts. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1996.
Hutchinson, Emma and Peter W. Kennedy. State Enforcement of Federal Standards: Impli-
cations for Interstate Pollution. Resource and Energy Economics 30 (2008), 316–344.
Jenkins, Stephen P. PGMHAZ8: Stata Module to Estimate Discrete Time (grouped data)
Proportional Hazards Models. http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s438501.html, 2004.
Kahn, Matthew. Domestic Pollution Havens: Evidence from Cancer Deaths in Border
Counties. Journal of Urban Economics 56 (2004), 51–69.
Lester, James P. and Ann O. Bowman. Implementing Environmental Policy in a Federal
System: A Test of the Sabatier-Mazmanian Model. Polity 21 (1989), 731–753.
Levinson, Arik. “An Industry-Adjusted Index of State Environmental Compliance Costs.”
In Behavioral and Distributional Effects of Environmental Policy. C. Carraro and G.
E. Metcalf, Eds. Cambridge, MA: NBER, 2000.
Levinson, Arik. Environmental Regulatory Competition: A Status Report and Some New
Evidence. National Tax Journal 56 (2003), 91–106.
Lin, C.-Y. Cynthia. How Should Standards Be Set and Met? On the Allocation of Reg-
ulatory Power in a Federal System. B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy:
Topics 10 (2010), Article 51.
List, John A. and Shelby Gerking. Regulatory Federalism and Environmental Protection
in the United States. Journal of Regional Science 40 (2000), 453–71.
Lockwood, Ben. Distributive Politics and the Costs of Centralization. Review of Economic
Studies 69 (2002), 313–337.
Lowry, William R. The Dimensions of Federalism: State Governments and Pollution Con-
trol Policies. Durham: Duke University Press, 1992.
Meyer, Bruce D. Unemployment Insurance and Unemployment Spells. Econometrica 58
(1990), 757–82.
33
Meyer, Stephen M. and David M. Konisky. Adopting Local Environmental Institutions: En-
vironmental Need and Economic Constraints. Political Research Quarterly 60 (2007),
3–16.
Millimet, Daniel L. Assessing the Empirical Impact of Environmental Federalism. Journal
of Regional Science 43 (2003), 711–733.
Morantz, Alison D. Has Devolution Injured American Workers? State and Federal Enforce-
ment of Construction Safety, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 25 (2009):
183–210.
Oates, Wallace E. “A Reconsideration of Environmental Federalism.” In Recent Advances
in Environmental Economics, John A. List and Aart de Zeeuw (eds.), Cheltenham,
U.K.: Edward Elgar, 2002, pp. 1–32.
Oates, Wallace E. Fiscal Federalism. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972.
Oates, Wallace E. and Robert M. Schwab. Economic Competition Among Jurisdictions:
Efficiency-Enhancing or Distortion-Inducing? Journal of Public Economics, 35 (1998),
333–54.
Poole, Keith T. Recovering a Basic Space from a Set of Issue Scales. American Journal of
Political Science 42 (1998), 954–993
Poole, Keith T. http://voteview.com. (Last viewed: August 2010).
Sigman, Hilary. Letting States Do the Dirty Work: State Responsibility for Federal Envi-
ronmental Regulation. National Tax Journal 56 (2003), 107–122.
Sigman, Hilary. Transboundary Spillovers and Decentralization of Environmental Policies.
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 50 (2005), 82–101.
Squire, Peverill. Legislative Professionalization and Membership Diversity in State Legis-
latures. Legislative Studies Quarterly 17 (1992), 69–79.
Stumpf, Koleman S. and Felix Oberholzer-Gee. Endogenous Policy Decentralization: Test-
ing the Central Tenet of Economic Federalism. Journal of Political Economy 110
(2002), 1–36.
U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO). EPA and the States: Environmental Challenges
Require a Better Working Relationship. Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting
Office, 1995.
U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO). Water Pollution: Differences among the States in
Issuing Permits Limiting the Discharge of Pollutants. Washington, D.C.: U.S. General
Accounting Office, 1996.
34
Wassenberg, Pinky S. “Implementation of Intergovernmental Regulatory Programs: A
Cost-Benefit Perspective.” In Intergovernmental Relations and Public Policy, J. Ed-
win Benton and David R. Morgan (eds.), Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1986, pp.
123–137.
Wikle, Thomas A. Geographical Patterns of Membership in U.S. Environmental Organiza-
tions. Professional Geographer 47 (1995), 41–48.
Woods, Neal D. Primacy Implementation of Environmental Policy in the U.S. States. Pub-
lius 36 (2006), 259–276.
35
